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Abstract Does space matter for local governments in the implementation of devel-
opment policies? Geographical distance is believed to weaken the transmission of the
socioeconomic development policy. Peripherally located local governments may be
weaker than those centrally located local governments. Polish local governments from
1995–2007 were assessed based on performance indicators. The results show that the
effective range of regional centres is limited to adjacent municipalities within a dis-
tance of 25 km and other local governments should be considered as having peripheral
significance.
JEL Classification R53 · H77 · H11
1 Introduction
The territorial administration reform of 1999 in Poland changed the institutional and
spatial regime for self-governments in Poland. The strategic objective1 of the reform
was to create strong NUTS2 regions (voivodeships, województwa), that could become
partners for other European regions (Kaczmarek 2005). The administrative change
1 Other goals were to adjust the public statistics system to the EUROSTAT reporting requirements and
to break up with the socialist regime.
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included the replacement of 49 small voivodeships2 and their regional governments
with 16 NUTS2 units with new regional authorities. NUTS4 / LAU13 districts (powiat),
the level of administration which had existed prior to 1975, were reintroduced to
play the role of intermediary government between the NUTS5 / LAU2 municipality
level (gmina) and NUTS2 voivodeship level. This decentralisation institutional reform
was made to strengthen bottom-up governance and to weaken the role of central
government in resolving everyday social problems (Kulesza 1993 and 2002). After
this reform, NUTS5 level authorities, the local ones, are expected to be financially
independent units and responsible for running a sustainable development policy, which
consists therefore of attracting new funds (i.e. from public grants, investors, taxes)
and spending it on community service (i.e. infrastructure, education, health care) and
development investments. NUTS2 authorities, the regional ones, are responsible i.e.
for supporting regional economy, creating entrepreneurship and innovative milieu and
provision of public goods and services on regional scale, which are always located in
some of NUTS5 units. NUTS2 investments and actions are to solve over local issues,
within their regional policy or postulated by local NUTS4 and NUTS5 units. Also,
spatial and sectoral distribution of NUTS2 funds follows the revealed by local units
development problems. The assumption of the reform was that new voivodeships,
with a stronger financial and organisational capacity, would stimulate weaker local
authorities within their respective operating areas. The reform and financial support
from EU funds were supposed to be a remedy to the country’s spatial diversity. The
first perceptible effect of the reform was the change in the spatial relations between
the self-government authorities. Primarily, both the geographical and the institutional
distance between municipalities and voivodeship capitals increased.
Much research has been carried out with respect to the functioning and effectiveness
of the provision of public goods by local and regional self-governments (e.g. Keat-
ing 1995; Newton 1982). Usually, however, studies focus on the concerns of ongoing
administration in the existing institutional settings. Ten years after the reform, the
collected data enable the analysis of institutional changes alone, and the determina-
tion whether the new administrative structure is more effective than the former one
in terms of promoting sustainable development. The Polish reform focused on reduc-
ing public expenditure and improving public service delivery (Manning and Parison
2003). The reform assumed that a diffusion mechanism would occur—stronger regions
would enhance weaker regions. The decentralisation was to be reinforced by the pol-
icy of investing in the “drivers”—the richest cities, which were to push forward the
development of weaker areas. The implementation of those mechanisms was strictly
related with the public sector, its tasks, competencies, capabilities, budget, etc. The
establishment of a hierarchical self-government formed the basis for those processes,
where functions were assigned to each level, individual or overlapping in terms of
their scope, but not in terms of the territory covered. A question arises whether the
2 They corresponded to NUTS3 level. However, before the 1999 reform, the NUTS classification was
not used in Poland. At present, there are no administrative authorities at the NUTS1 (region) and NUTS3
(subregion) levels.
3 In 2003 NUTS regulation changed NUTS4 into LAU1 and NUTS5 into LAU2, however, both names are
still used in literature (e.g. ESPON 2009)
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established institutions, which form the framework for the functioning of local gov-
ernments, were designed in such a way as to improve the effectiveness of the provision
of public goods and the transmission of policy that promotes socioeconomic develop-
ment. Institutional rent is an important concept in the study, and it is understood as the
proximity of regional authorities with significant competence. In particular, this refers
to a financial power of NUTS2 authorities. The administrative reform has deprived
many voivodeship capitals of their status and thus has increased the distance between
a substantial part of municipalities and regional centres. Due to the institutional tran-
sition which changed the relative location of municipalities, many of them became
peripheral. This applies mostly to weaker local governments, which were adjoined to
a stronger core.
The objective of the study is to determine to what extent the detrimental change, i.e.
the increased average geographical distance between municipalities and voivodeship
capitals, became a discriminating factor in the developmental regional policy imple-
mented by local governments. The thread of the argument was based on the hypotheses
that geographical distance weakens the top-down transmission of the socioeconomic
development policy, and that peripherally located local governments are weaker than
those centrally located. Consequently, the spatial effective range of regional centres,
i.e. voivodeship capitals, is insufficient. Therefore, the local government reform has
enhanced the significance of the institutional rent to local development, which leads
to a stronger diversification at the regional level.
2 The spatial performance of the public sector
Space is important in at least two aspects of governance: the provision of public goods
and services and the transmission of regional and local policy. In both mechanisms, one
can observe geographical aspects, which when included in the analysis, may change
non-spatial solutions and the equilibrium state.
First, in the provision of public goods and services, the spatial factor is involved
in decisions to locate hospitals, schools, leisure infrastructure, roads etc. and des-
ignate catchment areas for i.e. schools and public offices. Space is significant for
the performance of public responsibilities (Oakerson 1992). The local governments’
performance must be efficient: the supply of public goods should meet the demand,
economies of scale must exist and policy must correspond to the heterogeneous prefer-
ences of the local communities (Hooghe and Marks 2009). For community satisfaction,
high accessibility (service available quicker than maximum travel time threshold), low
congestion and high efficiency (maximum public service capacity to given spending)
are required. Local governments restrict the provision of public goods to their respec-
tive areas because of strong autonomy, overall competition and lack of cooperation
among territorial units. This mechanism is especially noticeable when the provision
of those goods generates a positive spatial external effect taken over by the commu-
nities of other local governments, without any costs of participation on their side. A
spatial external effect4 of a good or service is understood as the part of supply that may
4 External effects are spatially limited (Hanink 2006).
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Fig. 1 Effective location of public goods
be taken over by the inhabitants of other local entity because of its spatial range. A
neighbouring local government can act as a free rider. When no financial cooperation
exists, public good or service is financed from taxes and funds of one community and
used for free (as it is public good) by the other community members. Additionally,
relative overcrowding and queueing appears when scale of facility was planned for
one community and becomes used by neighbours. From the perspective of an individ-
ual local government, the effective location of a community or urban infrastructure,
enabling the provision of public goods, is closer to the centre, so that the effective
range is equal to or smaller than the respective territory (see Fig. 1b, c). This location
naturally limits the usage of facility by other communities as it extends travel time
from neighbouring administrative units. Such behaviour is contrary to the postulate of
global effectiveness; however, in micro-scale, it is reasonable.
An example to illustrate the model of effective location (see Fig. 1a) is the construc-
tion of a hospital on the border of a voivodeship. The effective range of the institution
would reach beyond the administrative borders, thus generating spatial external effects
and reducing the effectiveness of the local government. Faced with the choice of having
a zone without influence or reaching beyond the borders of the voivodeship, authorities
will be enticed by the former scenario (see Fig. 1b, c), which may result in the shortage
of public goods and services. Local authorities opt to locate the public infrastructure
(like a hospital) at the centre of the voivodeship, thus limiting the access of inhabitants
in the border municipalities. However, when a public infrastructure may have negative
effects, the reverse is true. For instance, in landfill services, local governments do not
have any incentive to internalise the negative social and environmental effects. Thus,
such operations will be located at the border of the area of the local government.
The problem of dividing space and providing public goods by local governments
can be compared with other spatial problems of designing optimal and useful catch-
ment areas. This is true in the localisation of post offices (Kenny 2005), primary and
secondary schools (Borland and Howsen 1992; Sutcliffe and Board 1986), hospitals
and health facilities (Church et al. 1995; Khan et al. 2001; Guagliardo 2004,) etc. Usu-
ally, too small catchment area is the source of inefficiency, evokes the problems with
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providing many specialty services, but in terms of society allows for better control and
transparency, direct democracy, etc. Meanwhile, catchment areas which are too big
can cause overcrowding, leading to higher costs in access, less democracy and trans-
parency for society and possible diseconomies of scale may cause many processes to
be uneconomical. The problem of regional and local governments is analogous, but
includes competencies issue. A local government like NUTS5 municipality may be
too small to operate effectively and to promote sustainable growth. NUTS4 districts,
the intermediary level, although better suited in terms of “size”, do not have the nec-
essary competencies, as their statutory responsibilities are of a different nature than
those of municipalities, while NUTS2 voivodeships are too large and the cost of scale
increases. In theory, decentralisation enables the adjustment of the provision of pub-
lic goods to heterogeneous social preferences. However, there is a trade-off between
cost-effectiveness and maximisation of social utility.
The spatial range of local governments applies also to the effects of the socioeco-
nomic policy. Here, a spatial scale exists as well, being a consequence of the admin-
istrative and territorial division (Spicer 2006). The vertical hierarchy and the size of
the local government, which involve division of competencies and diverse impact,
are the foundation of an effectively diversified range of policy. Within hierarchical
administrative structures, the intermediary level is the source of unreliability. In this
intermediation, extent and range are of great importance. NUTS2 voivodeship author-
ities forward programmes of action to NUTS4 district authorities because these are
more suitable in terms of geography and competencies than the municipalities. It can
be modelled as “signal transmission”. The transmission mechanisms should work
both top-down and bottom-up. Districts as intermediary are expected to demonstrate
initiative to integrate the municipalities and to transmit the “signal” between munici-
palities and the voivodeship authorities. At this stage, a particularly significant question
arises–do the NUTS4 districts enhance or weaken the signal, when transmitting it to
the NUTS5 municipalities? As a transmitter, the districts ought to augment the trans-
mission to reach each municipality, even the most remote ones. If, however, the district
weakens the signal, it is likely that the signal will not reach the municipality level. It
means that the municipalities would not fully implement the voivodeship policy.
Policy transmission can be treated as a stream of tacit knowledge. The circulation
between heterogeneous actors is strictly dependent on the distance, both geographical
as well as cultural and social. The more remote the authorities are, the weaker the flow
of knowledge and the more difficult their interaction is with the centre (Dicken 2007).5
The significance of spatial concentration in the learning process is understood as the
ability to develop new ways of acting, skills, networks of social interrelations, etc.
(Lundvall and Johnson 1994). In addition, learning requires interaction and combin-
ing knowledge and information from many sources. Those mechanisms benefit from
proximity.
What affects the strength of signal transmission by districts? In addition to the
distance factor, there are at least more factors: the competencies and the cooperation
5 Concept started by Tobler (1970), developed in quantitative distance-decay models (Fotheringham and
O’Kelly 1989). Currently socioeconomic patterns which are homogenous over space sometimes are rarely
assumed in the literature.
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network. Competencies are understood as the general influential power of district
authorities. It consists of the legal capacity, budget and governance. Limited com-
petencies are restrictive. The cooperation network of municipalities within a district
is significant. The district needs to make more efforts to reach an individual, non-
cooperating municipality than to transmit the same signal to a network of interrelated
municipalities. Thus, geographical distance matters. The effective range of voivode-
ship authorities does not need to cover the entire territory of the voivodeship, owing
to transmissions at the level of the district. However, when districts fail to duly meet
their responsibilities, the influence of voivodeship may not go beyond the district level.
Thus, policy signals are better received by the municipalities and districts located near
the voivodeship entities.
The implementation of policy is founded on two groups of actions. Primarily, direct
financial transfer, usually by central or regional authorities, (partly) contributes to the
budgets of local governments. The effective range here is basically unlimited, and
the implementation is instant. However, in management activities, spatial proximity
is critical. The decision on public investment relies on information and social inter-
actions (i.e. negotiations, appropriateness of action). Large administrative units have
to overcome the geographical distance from their local entities. Regional authorities
may not have the accurate information and appreciation for the local situation which
may lead to weak decisions. Moreover, geographical distance and population poten-
tial may make the operational management of a large unit more difficult than that of
a small entity.
The core–periphery model offers another explanation as to how remote local gov-
ernments can be weaker. When spatial distribution of economic activity is not equalised
over space, often centripetal forces attract resources from the periphery to the core. The
absence of cooperation between the central cities and the surrounding municipalities,
with their relations being based on competition, exacerbates the economic differences
between the areas (Kopczewska 2009). Divergence is a natural process, like the fact
that only the fittest survives in nature.
Institutional rent is a consequence of the core–periphery model. Voivodeship cap-
itals, as strong regional centres, attract business and new inhabitants, while munici-
palities where no administrative authorities are located are less attractive in terms of
investments, living, culture, etc. Municipalities adjacent to the centre benefit from the
institutional rent. Their location is often the only source of comparative advantage
over other municipalities, similar but peripheral. On the other hand, the spatial distri-
bution of economic and social activity or of regional welfare is of great importance.
When large voivodeships are an effect of an administrative marriage between weak
and strong units, strong municipalities are usually located in the centre, and the weaker
adjoined municipalities are located in the periphery, as the objective of the reform was
to join development drivers with the peripheries. Therefore, remote municipalities
are naturally weaker. Such an administrative reform deteriorates their relative loca-
tion, which does not provide any developmental incentive but rather consolidates their
developmental stage.
Provision of public goods and services in core–periphery model has also cost-
efficiency dimension. Due to economies of scale, supporting communities in low-
density areas with all necessary local public services are more costly than in urbanised
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areas. Studies on urban sprawl (Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2003; Hortas-Rico and Sole-
Olle 2010) prove that public services, which provision cost is distance-dependent
(infrastructure and community facility i.e. street cleaning, trash collection, public
transport), meet raising costs by ca. 2–7 % in low-density areas, assuming the same
quality and quantity as in cities. Thus, implications in core–periphery model are seri-
ous. Peripheral local governments spending less per capita should suffer from double
negative effect: lower per capita expenditures and higher provision cost should result
in reduced quality and quantity of public goods and services provided.
3 Space transformation by the administrative reform
There is a broad literature on the Polish territorial administration reform of 1999, its
preparation, implementation, expected outcome, new institutional settings, etc. (e.g.
Kulesza 2002; Kaczmarek 2005). The most important change in the Polish admin-
istration reform of 1999 consisted in the relocation of regional centres–voivodeship
capitals. The elimination of the majority of voivodeship capitals caused the NUTS2 ter-
ritories to grow (three- to sixfold) and thus increased the distance in the core–periphery
relation (see Table 1). In the previous system, the average distance between a munic-
ipality and the central city within a voivodeship ranged from ∼17 km to ∼46 km,
whereas the maximum distance (the voivodeship span) ranged from 28 to 143 km.
Under the existing administrative division, the average distance from a municipality
to a voivodeship capital is within a range of 30–80 km, and the most peripheral munic-
ipalities are at an average distance of 121 km (between 69 and 179 km) (see Fig. 2).
Due to the reform, nearly 60 % of municipalities (1,500 units) moved away from their
central city (on average about 46 km, half of about 42 km, up to 156 km), and only 6 %
(150 units) gained closer proximity to their central city (by an average of 12 km, half
of about 10 km). Before the reform, 18 % of municipalities were located more than
50 km from the centre, then after 1999 this number rose to 58 %. The establishment
of district levels, which is closer to the municipalities than to the former voivodeship
capitals, has brought the municipalities nearer the centres of power, albeit with less
competence. Spatial accessibility has been defined as road distance not longer than
60–90 min (Cinnamon et al. 2008; ESPON 2007) for access to palliative care or trans-
portation to the airport in terms of the territorial cohesion. While Euclidean distance
is constant over time, the road distance and travel time depend on the road network,
quality, capacity, etc. In Polish conditions, the following approximations are proposed
1 km Euclidean distance = 1.2 km road distance and the 1 km road distance = 1.06 min
travel time.6 Thus, a travel time of 90 min corresponds to the Euclidean distance of
70 km. In the new administrative system, up to 800 municipalities (32 %) are located
more than 70 km Euclidean distance. This means that these areas are not accessible
from the core city in less than 90 min by car. Results for local governments would be
even worse, especially if the public mode of transportation (bus or train) were taken
6 For a random sample of 100 municipalities within 50, 100 and 150 km from the central city a road distance
and an estimated travel time were calculated. Web-map www.zumi.pl was used. Results are at regression
coefficients with significance level less than 0.00001.
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Table 1 The size of local governments before and after the 1999 reform
Voivodeship New division Old division
16 NUTS2 units 49 NUTS3-like units
Min Max Min Max
Area (km2) 9,412 35,557 1,523 12,327
Number of municipalities in voivodeships 71 314 20 150
Average distance between municipality and
voivodeship capital (km)
30 80 17.5 46.4
Max. distance between municipality and
voivodeship capital (km)
69 179 28 143
Number of districts (NUTS4) 12 42 – –
Inhabitants (2006) (in thousands) 171.7 5,008 249.7 3,918.4
Inhabitants per municipality (in thousands) 10.14 28.13 – –
Inhabitants in voivodeship capital
(in thousands)
86 1,702 11.89 1,635
Density of population (persons/km2) 59.03 378.56 46.46 729.61
Fig. 2 Distance between municipalities and voivodeship capitals prior to and after the 1999 reform
into account.7 The obtained results of multiplier for road distance on the basis of great
circle are similar to estimations by Tobler (1993).
The 1999 administration reform redistributed the responsibilities and competencies
between the local and regional levels of authority. The philosophy of power separation
results in the catalogue of responsibilities, obligations, rights, etc. It can be assumed
that the responsibility of voivodeship authorities is to develop long-term regional
7 Research on a spatial availability of the nearest secondary school shows the average time of getting to
school at 8 am by bus is 56 min, for 60 % locations is more than 45 min and for 10 % locations is more than
120 min (Guzik 2003).
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development strategies. Activity profiles, priority actions, essential investments, etc.
are defined for the entire voivodeship. Thus, the voivodeship authorities set the general
direction of changes and the support framework. NUTS5/LAU2 municipalities are in
charge of most of the ongoing activity, which should be carried out in such a way as
to provide public goods and services that are best suited to the needs and preferences
of the inhabitants. Investments or future-oriented activities are supposed to be in line
with the voivodeship strategy. Districts are responsible for ongoing activities, mostly
local, but of an intermunicipality character, such as intermunicipality infrastructure,
the labour market, and security and defence. According to the assumptions of the
administrative reform, NUTS2 voivodeships are supposed to be strong bodies. At
present, they concentrate populations from 1 to 5 million.8 This equals the population
of many European countries such as Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Ireland,
Croatia or Norway, which gives the voivodeship the potential to play a significant role
in the international market. NUTS4/LAU1 districts cannot be more than local centres,
in many cases without any chance to become the real core, due to their location and
territories, hierarchy and competences. They do not exceed a population of 150,000
people, with a population of 100,000 on average.
Institutional reform was a necessity to break with the communist order—the central
control, in which regional authorities have only been a transmission belt for the cen-
tral decisions. In the new order, NUTS5 became a basic element of democratisation
process, taking into account all the consequences (Grochowski 1997). Democracy is
equated with independence, both financial and in the decision-making. The current
division of responsibilities implies a natural cooperation between municipal, district
and voivodeship authorities. The voivodeship government identifies the strategic path
for the future and undertakes the provision of the needs of its districts and munici-
palities. Efficient local authorities use their freedom to work towards development,
while weaker local units expect regional government assistance. The crucial point is
whether voivodeship authorities appreciate the problems in the remote localities. The
voivodeship may be too large to manage the uniform development of its peripheries.
This is the problem of institutional design and creation transparent mechanism of
intergovernmental relationships.
4 Spatial and institutional factors versus the performance of local governments
This empirical study aims to determine how the increasing distance between NUTS2
and NUTS5 level and relative peripheralization of local governments affect the per-
formance of local governments and the implementation of a sustainable socioeco-
nomic policy. On the basis of the available financial and development indicators for
1995–2007, a cross-section time-series analysis at the NUTS5 level was performed.
Distances between municipalities and their respective voivodeship capitals were
8 The population of “old” voivodeships ranged between 300,000 and 4 million, but most of them did not
exceed a population of a million.
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Municipalities − Economic entities per 1000 inhabitants
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 25 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 25 km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50 km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship












Municipalities − Rate of unemployment
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 15 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 15km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located further than 100 km to capital of voivodeship
Fig. 3 Socio-economic performance of municipalities according to the distance to centres of power
calculated for both administrative divisions.9 Development trends were compared for
municipalities, which include: the voivodeship capitals and the municipalities located
at a distance of less than 25, 25–50 km, 50–100 km and more than 100 km (see Figs. 3
and 4). The groups of municipalities located at a certain distance before and after the
reform are not composed of the same municipalities. Therefore, statistical bias occurs,
and shifts in trends are possible. Before 1999, only four of ca. 2500 municipalities
were located at a distance of more than 100 km from the voivodeship capitals. After
the reform, the sample of voivodeship capitals was substantially reduced and ca. 11 %
was located farther than 100 km from the central city.
The effective transmission of regional policy to the local level should equalise
socioeconomic development parameters in terms of per capita values. This should be
reflected in similar patterns of municipality development, irrespective of location, and
in the balancing of the structure and magnitude of municipality budgets, both in terms
of revenues and expenditures. The investigation of the effective range of a regional
government is to answer the question: “Does the performance of the remote munic-
ipalities significantly differ from that of central municipalities?”. The distribution of
the municipalities at specific distances from the centre (see Table 2) clearly indicates
that the prevailing distance after 1999 reform shifted from the 25–50 km interval to
50–100 km.
First of all, substantial inequalities can be seen in the labour market (see Fig. 3a,
b). Business is clearly concentrated in the voivodeship capitals (approximately 130
entities per 1,000 inhabitants), and for municipalities located at a distance of more
than 25 km, the level is about 50 % of the voivodeship average. The unemployment
rate is the most sensitive indicator of the influence of distance. In the municipalities
located at a distance of more than 100 km, the unemployment rate since 2003 has been
9 The Euclidean distance was calculated between the centroids of figures representing the municipalities.
Transport distances and travel time distances would give more detailed information on spatial separation,
however, this kind of matrix is not available and multiplier approximation used in this study gives the
reliable results.
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Municipalities − Total Revenues per Capita
at constant prices of base year 2007
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 25 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 25km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship























Municipalities − Own Revenues per Capita
at constant prices of base year 2007
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 25 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 25km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship





















Municipalities − PIT Revenues per Capita
at constant prices of base year 2007
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 25 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 25 km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50 km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship























Municipalities − Investment Expenditures per Capita
at constant prices of base year 2007
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 25 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 25 km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50 km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship



























Municipalities − Education Expenditures per Capita
at constant prices of base year 2007
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 25 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 25 km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship























Municipalities − Health Care Expenditures per Capita
at constant prices of base year 2007
Municipalities performance vs. distance to capital of voivodeship in given years
capitals of voivodeships (in given year)
gminas located closer than 25 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 25 km and 50 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located between 50 km and 100 km to capital of voivodeship
gminas located further than 100 km to capital of voivodeship
Reform of 1999
Fig. 4 Financial performance of municipalities according to the distance to centres of power
consistently doubled that of the voivodeship capital rate. In 2007, on average, for each
subsequent distance interval (which in approx. is 60 min. travel time), unemployment
rate was 1.5 percentage points higher; in 2003 (when the general unemployment rate
was higher), the difference was 2–2.5 percentage points. The farther the locality was
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Table 2 Number of municipalities within a distance of 15, 50 and 100 km from their respective voivodeship
capitals
Administrative division Voivodeship capital Distance to voivodeship
<25 km 25–50 km 50–100 km >100 km
Old division 49 293 1,694 431 4
New division 16 92 917 1,168 266
from the centre, the more difficult the labour market. The composition of working
females and males is heterogeneous over space. In remote municipalities, there are
more than 1.2 employed women per employed man. An opposite phenomenon can be
seen in the municipalities adjacent to voivodeship towns, with approximately 7 % less
women than men among the employed. This may be attributed to two phenomena:
the inability of men to work and the discrimination against women. These are the
statistics for 80 % of employees—in the industry (3.1 mln people) and services (5.2
mln people), without agriculture (2.1 mln people). In the data, there is a problem of
small sample, because the economic activity rate of people in working age (17–65)
fluctuates around 18–20 % in the municipalities and ca.54 % in core cities (data for
2007). Those data reflect the transmission (or rather the absence thereof) of the labour
market policy and is a low attractiveness index of peripheral municipalities. In spite
of the fact that the number of firms per capita is not related to location (except for
the centre), the labour markets of the most remote municipalities demonstrate a high
unemployment rate and a high percentage of women in the employed population.
The analysis implies (see Fig. 4a–f) that distance is correlated with funding for the
municipalities. The periods before and after the reform are not fully comparable, as the
principles of financing have changed for local government. Government expenditures
in GDP increased from 5.8 % in 1991 up to 12.6 % in 2001 and 11.5 % in 2008.
From a cross-cutting perspective, the revenues and expenditures of municipalities per
capita for each year are substantially higher in voivodeship capitals. In 2007, the per
capita total revenues of local governments located just 25 km away from the centre
were approximately 25 % lower than in the voivodeship capitals, and 35 % lower in
municipalities located more than 25 km away. Own revenues of the other municipalities
were even worse in comparison with voivodeship capitals: 27 % lower in radius of
25 km and 60 % lower in farther locations. Also, the PIT (personal income tax) revenues
account only for 60 % of the voivodeship capital level within a distance of 25 km, and
nearly 30 % at a distance of more than 25 km.10 The investment expenditures of the
municipalities located at a distance of more than 25 km from the centre are similar
and account for approximately 50 % of the investment expenditures of voivodeship
capitals.
According to expectations, core units spend and earn more per capita. However,
the impact of the centre dies out in the 25-km range. Units located farther run the
10 Statistics are biased due to “farmers’ effect” i.e. farmers are not covered by PIT as a group with a
traditionally lower income. The number of farmers increases with distance to the centre. Therefore, the
effect of decreased PIT revenue is doubled (lower income of population and lower number of taxpayers).
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same budget policy, which is much weaker than that in the centre and below national
average. The periphery is the area located at a distance of more than 25 km from the
voivodeship capital. Therefore, there is no spatial differentiation in the activities of
the local governments, but only the institutional effect can be seen. The size of the
voivodeship does not affect the municipality budgets. Non-core municipalities act in
a similar way across the entire territory. However, the substantial difference between
those municipalities and the centres is puzzling—this reflects regional divergence
without any diffusion. Voivodeship capitals are development drivers, generating sub-
stantially higher revenues and expenditures. However, they do not stimulate the other
municipalities. The municipalities located closer than 25 km from the town are usually
the “bedroom suburbs”, performing auxiliary functions to the core. They benefit from
the geographical and institutional rent, albeit only a moderate one.
Also, the inequalities in welfare, including kindergartens, health care, housing and
education policy, are likewise apparent. The farther a municipality is from the centre,
the fewer children (as a population percentage) attend kindergartens. This is due both
to the scarcity of kindergartens, which are governed by local self-governments, and
to the ageing population as a result of the migration of people to big cities. The
process of ageing is visible on the entire territory. In 10 years (1997–2007), the ratio
of older people to young people has increased by 20 p.p. from 0.58 to 0.78. This
process seems to be stronger in core cities; however, this effect may be challenged
statistically: many people living in the city rent flats without being registered.11 Also,
residential development proves that attractive locations are in the range of 25 km.
Taking the real estate market as indicator of the attractiveness and the shift in 1999
in trend of the number of dwellings, one can see that cities, which lost their status
of voivodeship capital, were not an attractive area for investment—both private and
corporate. In 1999, government carried out reforms of education and health service,
primarily by changing the rules of financing and control. The shifts in public spending
became visible. Spatial cross section proves that peripheries are under-financed, thus
providing lower quality public services.
The statistical results presented above can be confirmed by spatial econometric
modelling. Localisation, defined as distance to regional centre, impacts the behaviour
of territorial units. As the NUTS5 units performance changes are explained with the
distance, the spatial interactions model was chosen (Fotheringham and O’Kelly 1989).
Three modifications of the basic model were introduced: firstly, instead of two-way
flows, one-way flows were applied because the purpose of modelling is to capture
policy flows from NUTS2 to NUTS5 units only. Secondly, polynomial specification
instead of commonly used exponential and power functional forms was chosen (Taylor
1975). Thirdly, the spatial autocorrelation component was included in the error term,
so the spatial error model instead of traditional model was estimated. NUTS5 units are
connected neighbours because of joint adherence to hierarchically higher administra-
tion NUTS4 units. Those modifications significantly improved the estimation results.
11 In Poland, there is an obligation to have a registered address of permanent residence and people are
usually registered in their own property, even when living and working in other city. This register is the
basis of population statistics.
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In the model, the relative revenues or expenditures per capita at 2007 prices given
as national average = 100 % for 2007 (xx1) were explained by analogous variable from
1999 (xx0), fourth-order polynomial Euclidean distance (DIST) between NUTS2 and
NUTS5 (DIST1, DIST2, DIST3 and DIST4) and control variable CITY, which is a
dummy variable for NUTS5 units, which are the locations of NUTS4 authorities. The
relative change in “ranking” (level above/below the average) after the reform of 1999
should result from geographical proximity to the centre, starting point and institutional
rent. It was expected that a given starting point increase in distance should lower the
ranking position, while having a the seat of government NUTS4 (dummy = 1) should
increase the rankings as a result of institutional rent. The estimated spatial error model
is as follows:
xx1 = β0 + β1 · xx0 + β2 · city + γ1 · DIST + γ2 · DIST2 + γ3 · DIST3
+γ4 · DIST4 + e
and e = λW e + u.
The spatial error model was applied, so that filtering shocks in policy transmission
to the lowest NUTS5 level were possible. Spatial weight matrix W was assumed
as row-standardised contiguity matrix of 2,471 units, with no islands in the sample.
This kind of nonlinear modelling is also used in spatial interpolation. In the estimated
polynomial regression, the same problems as those seen in trend surface analysis occur
(Legendre and Legendre 1998): strong impact of extreme values on estimation results
and edge effect, where polynomial functions take unrealistic values for high values of
explanatory variable (distance). In this model, estimates above 150 km are unreliable
because of the small number of NUTS5 units that are of great distance from their
centre (Table 3).
The obtained results seem very promising. Approximately all polynomial functions
for six dependent variables cross the line y = 1 at distance (x) of 25 km (see Fig. 5).
This means that, on average, local government units located closer than 25 km from
voivodeship city perform their budgets above national average. This implies the exis-
tence of strong centripetal forces, which can cause regional divergence inside NUTS2
units. A status of “periphery” is assigned to units located farther than 25 km. With this
distance, diffusion impact expires. Institutional rent cannot be unequivocally defined–
the dummy variable CITY coefficient is almost always significant, but the sign is
changeable. The spatial coefficient λ is always significant, relatively high and posi-
tive, and Akaike information criterion is almost always better for spatial specification
what confirms the need for using a spatial error model.
5 Conclusions
The goal of this study was to determine whether regional and local governments,
despite varying locations relative to the centre, implement a balanced socioeconomic
policy. The distance from the centre NUTS2 voivodeship capital was proven to be
important to the performance of NUTS5 municipalities. After the 1999 administration
reform, which assumed the establishment of large and strong regions (voivodeships),
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Fig. 5 Simulation of estimated models
the emergence of strongly developing voivodeship capitals and weaker peripheries
was observed. The municipalities located more than 25 km away from the voivodeship
capital can already be considered peripheries and the distance does not matter–many
processes are similar both at a distance of 25 and 100 km from the centre. This spatial
pattern indicates that there is no actual NUTS2-wide diffusion from the core towards
the peripheries; only core surrounding units benefit from these centrifugal forces.
Voivodeship capitals carry out the development process on their own, and the adjacent
municipalities benefit from diffusion to a moderate extent. The influence of regional
governments and the effect of institutional rent do not go beyond the distance of 25 km
from the core.
The presented statistics clearly indicate a process of local divergence. Socioeco-
nomic development and the activities of local governments in the centre are different
from those of peripheral municipalities, and municipalities located just 25 km away
from the regional centre should be considered peripheries. This proves that the core–
periphery model is growing stronger. It should be noted that, before the administrative
reform of 1999, location was not so important, especially for municipal budgets; rev-
enues and expenditures per capita were similar. The analysis of changes over time
shows that the gap is growing, which may lead to a deeper marginalisation of non-
central municipalities and to the concentration of socioeconomic activities in large
cities.
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The above presented analysis leads to the conclusion that the establishment of 16
strong centres in place of 49 weaker centres has caused regional divergence to inten-
sify. The absence of the diffusion process has caused voivodeship capitals to grow
in strength at the expense of other local governments. The pre-reform division guar-
anteed a larger number of urban centres the instruments to stimulate their respective
peripheries. Benefits from the institutional rent of smaller centres of power enabled the
wider diffusion of development processes within the natural reach of approximately
25 km. Paradoxically, a larger number of weaker voivodeship capitals ensured better
institutional settings to promote sustainable development.
The study shows that “invisible hand of market” and hope that decentralisation
and self-responsibility will ensure sustainable development is a myth. Natural forces
exacerbate divergence process. Having in mind Common Regional Policy seems that
an equal opportunity policy (convergence and cohesion) is a must, both for the society
and for the economy. The absence of such a policy entails an increasing regional
divergence. Also, the expected diffusion mechanism is often imperfect. The pol-
icy of investing in “development drivers” may imply the diffusion, but this process
requires institutional support in creation transmission channels and incentives. When
the infrastructure (as a basis), and economic or social benefits (as catalysts) are lacking,
then usually the diffusion mechanism fails leading to the disadvantage of peripheral
municipalities.
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